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REGULATING NETWORK INDUSTRIES: A
LOOK AT 1NTEL
RANDAL C. PICKER*

The question "Does Regulation Promote Efficiency in
Network Industries?" - the topic for the panel discussion
associated with this paper-can best be answered through an
initial general orientation on the topic, followed by a careful
consideration of a particular situation. To that end, Part I
discusses ways of defining network industries, while Part II
sets out briefly the patterns of regulation that we see in
Part III turns to the Federal Trade
network industries.
Commission's recently settled case against Intel. Part IV
concludes.
To preview the conclusions, evaluating the FTC's case
against Intel turns on tricky issues regarding the dynamics of
cross-licensing. That case appears to give very little weight to
the benefits that arise from royalty-free cross-licenses. This
practice reduces the royalty rates that will be charged to
personal computer makers to the direct benefit of consumers.
The settlement may very well make it more difficult for Intel to
negotiate royalty-free cross-licenses. Indeed, from the FTC's
perspective, that is the main point. This settlement makes it
possible for prospective PC makers who might otherwise
decline to deal with Intel to do so-though this is not a point
that appears to have figured in the FTC's calculus-and may
foster research and development on microprocessors, which
was the chief focus of the FTC's complaint. Still, there is little
public evidence to suggest such an outcome, and in any event,
this conclusion turns on the unexamined question of the
* Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago
Law School and Director, Olin Program in Law and Economics. I thank the Sarah Scaife
Foundation and the Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation for their generous research
support, and Richard Epstein and Doug Lichtman for comments. This essay is a revised
version of oral remarks presented at the Federalist Society Eighteenth Annual Student
Symposium at The University of Chicago Law School on April 9-10,1999.
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relative importance for a licensor of cash returns versus the inkind returns that are obtained from cross-licenses.
As for the initial question about whether regulation
promotes efficiency in network industries, the irony here is that
the settlement is generally seen as quite narrow and that Intel
settled to avoid much more stringent possibilities. That is
certainly true, but the sharpness of the scalpel has little to do
with the possible pain that it can inflict. Whether the
settlement promotes efficiency turns on very subtle
assessments, none of which are accessible from the public
record in the case, if they were made at all.
I. DEFINING NETWORK INDUSTRIES
We should start by trying to define a network industry. For
our purposes, two settings are relevant. In the first settingwhere a network industry is defined by a physical network-a
distribution grid typically is the backbone that defines the
network and that in turn makes a network industry. Natural
settings include telegraphs, railroads, telecommunications, oil
and natural gas pipelines. Substantial fixed costs, natural uses
and weak alternative uses, and an essential physical
connectivity all characterize these industries.
These industries often coexist physically because the same
connected set of rights-of-way can be used over and over.
Telegraphs were strung up to parallel railroads from the very
start. When Congress played amateur venture capitalistgiving cash and taking back no equity-and appropriated
$30,000 to allow Samuel Morse to test the "practicability and
utility" of the "electro-magnetic telegraph,"' Morse turned to
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to seek permission to string his
wires along its rights-of-way, which he received in exchange
for giving the railroad the right to use the telegraph for
nothing.2
Congress came to understand the natural
between
railroads and the telegraph-one set of
relationship
rights-of-way, two uses-and the land-grant program that led
1. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 84, 5 Stat. 618 (allocating funds to test the practicality of

establishing a system of electro-magnetic telegraphs).
2 See ROBERT L. THOMPSON, WIRING A CONTINENT: THE HISTORY OF THE TELEGRAPH
INDUSTRY INTHE UNITED STATES, 1832-1866 21-22 (1947).
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to the great railroads of the nineteenth century, including the
Union Pacific, called for joint development of railroads and the
This relationship continues today: Qwest
telegraph.3
Communications, a recent entrant into the high-bandwidth
communications business, built its network along the tracks of
the Union Pacific,4 while Williams Communications, a likeminded entrant, installed fiber-optic cable next to its natural
5
gas pipelines.
The second setting is the virtual network industry, which
typically is organized around an ubiquitous standard. The
Wintel duopoly-Intel microprocessors coupled with the
Microsoft Windows operating system- defines such a standard
for PCs. The standard specification for DVDs is another
example. Sun's recent attempt to offer Java as a universal
platform for software is yet another. Again, we often have very
large fixed costs-the research and development to develop a
microprocessor or an operating system-and low marginal
costs. These cost considerations will limit the number of
standards that will be at work at any one time. In addition,
though much less relevant for physical network industries,
demand-side considerations -or network externalities, in a
phrase-will also apply pressure to limit the number of extant
standards.
Tease these out a bit. Networks come and go as technology
changes. For example, in an era in which generation of
electricity was thought to be subject to substantial economies of
scale and in which transmission losses precluded substantial
distribution over a distance, the electricity business was
These were
characterized by local natural monopolies.
traditional regulated industries-the quintessential public
utilities. In time, we learned that bigger was not necessarily
better for generating electricity. Very large nuclear power
3. See Act of July 1,1862, ch. 120,12 Stat. 488 (providing aid for the construction of a
railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean and securing
government use of the line); see also Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365 (creating
the Northern Pacific Railroad); see generally Act of July 24, 1866, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 220
(providing aid for the construction of telegraph and railroad lines).
4. See Lisa Brownlee, Going the Distance: Joseph Nacchio Isn't Relenting in his Qwestfor
U.S. West, N.Y. POST, June 27,1999, at 56.
S. See Jennifer Walsh, Crossing Lines: Pipeline Firms See the Light in Fiber Optics,

HOUSTON CHRON., June 23,1999, at 1.
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plants had disproportionately larger downtimes than smaller
plants. 6 Large plants also had very long lead times and
therefore locked generators onto a path that could not be
responsive to changes in market conditions. In contrast,
smaller plants could be brought on-line in a much shorter time
period, creating valuable flexibility. 7 It thus becomes plausible
that electricity in Chicago should be generated by multiple
sources.8 That of course says nothing about the ownership of
those sources-one company could build five 100-Megawatt
plants rather than one 500-Megawatt plant-but this clearly
makes it easier to have many companies in the generation
business.
Shift from generation to transmission. Even if we want to
have many companies generating electricity, it is less obvious
that we want to have many companies transmitting electricity.
Put differently, even if generation is no longer subject to
natural monopoly characteristics, transmission may be, in the
sense that it may make sense to have a single transmission grid.
Again, the number of facilities says nothing about the
ownership of the facilities. We could have a single owner of
the transmission grid, or we could have shared ownership of
the grid by all generators.
We can now step back and see how the electricity business
has evolved into a network industry. Before, we had a single
generator and a single owner of the transmission grid. Now,
we have multiple generators, and we are going to match those
generators with a single transmission grid. Ownership of the
grid itself must be addressed, and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission is doing exactly that through its
independent system operator approach and its newly proposed
regional transmission organization plan.9
Ownership,
6. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 18 C.F.R. §§ 35 & 385 (1996) [hereinafter Order888].
7. For a precise method of valuing this flexibility using real options, see AVINASH K.
DDuT &ROBERTS. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 51-54 (1994).
8. See Steve Daniels, CornEdRival Puts Money on the Barrel: Enron Offers First Glinpse
at Pricing War; OthersExpected to Follow, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUS., July 19,1999, at 1.
9. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,390 (1999) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)(proposed June 10, 1999) [hereinafter FERCRTO], issued as
FERC Order No. 2000, 89 FERC 61,285 (December 20,1999).
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however, merely leads to the issues of more direct concern:
generator access to the grid and continued development of the
grid.
Consider virtual network industries. In these industries, the
existence of a universal standard defines the scope of the
network. Multiple standards may be at work in such an
industry, as in the early days of the VCR market and as in the
current PC market, but the ultimate success of one standard
over another-VHS over Beta and Windows over Macintoshmeans that access to the successful standard becomes
important for continuing success in the industry. Consider, for
example, music distribution, which has moved from vinyl
records to cassettes and 8-tracks to CDs, and now perhaps to
online distribution over the Internet. A recording artist denied
access to these media simply would not exist. The artist could
be the greatest thing since Mozart, but if she were distributing
her work on modified clam shells, it wouldn't matter. Access
to the standard means of distribution is essential.
These standards do not arise through a single process. For
example, in the early 1980s, when the original CD format was
established, the industry used three competing approaches: a
12-cm optical compact disk system from Philips and Sony (the
eventual winner); a 7-cm mini-disc system from Telefunken;
and the much larger 26-cm audio high density system from
JVC.10 Each of these represented a move into the world of
digital music, but certain important features differentiated the
systems. The Telefunken system used the prior generation of
record-pressing equipment, thereby reducing switching costs
for manufacturers. The JVC system was backwards compatible
with JVC's proprietary videodisc machines. 1 A group formed
in Japan, the Digital Audio Disc Council, provided the industry
with a forum for evaluating these competing platforms, with
the hope of agreeing on a single standard. In January of 1981,
before that group could act, Matsushita, the corporate parent of

10. See DigitalAudio Disc Council Disbands After Three Years, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN
UAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL), Apr. 21, 1981, at 9; see also DigitalAudio is Due to Become
Popularin Two Years, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN JAPAN ECON. J.), Sept. 16,1980, at 8.
11. See The DigitalRevolution Aheadfor the Audio Industry, BUS. WK., Mar. 16, 1981, at
40.
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JVC, announced that it would support the Philips/Sony system
and would sign appropriate cross-licenses with Philips and
Sony. This agreement decisively tilted the tables in favor of the
2
now-standard 12-cm format'
In the case of DVDs, an elaborate specification process' 3 has
resolved differences between competing approaches backed by
Sony-Philips, on the one hand, and Toshiba-Time Warner, on
the other. This process has also led to the formation of two
patent pools that facilitate the creation of the standards
infrastructure necessary to make DVDs workable.' 4 In other
cases-including

that of the Wintel

standard-a

single

provider emerges as the dominant source of the product and
exercises strong control over the standard. The dominance of
Intel over microprocessors has meant that Intel sets the
standards, while its competitors, at best, attempt to replicate
what Intel has done. In operating systems that use Intel
microprocessors, Microsoft has simply set the standard.
Even in the case of a dominant standard owned by a single
party, complete victory after the fact may just reflect the
powerful combination of demand- and supply-side economies
of scale, which obscures the reality that substantial competition
existed at the standard-setting stage. It is easy to forget that
Windows itself once competed in a crowded marketplace for
the chance to determine the next step from the character-based,
single-tasking world of DOS. Windows started as a DOS
12. See MatsushitaElectricInd. Will Use Philipsformula, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN (JAPAN

ECON. J.), Jan. 27, 1981, at 8. For an interesting look at the chicken-and-egg problem
that exists with hardware and software complements, see Neil Gandal et al., The
Dynamics of Technological Adoption in Hardware/Software Systems: The Case of Compact

DiscPlayers (unpublished manuscript, February 1,1998). And now the fight has begun
again, as it is now possible to make "warmer" CDs that should appeal to audiophiles.
Matsushita has one version, Sony-Philips another, and so it goes. See Peter Landers,
Japanese Makers are Introducing Rival Successors to CD Player, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1999,
at B1.
13. See Martin Levine, Single DVD StandardReached: Market Debut Still a Question,
VIDEO Bus., Dec. 22,1995, at 6. For the specifications, see DVD Specifications (visited
Oct. 1,1999) <http://www.licensing.philips.com/dvdsystems/dvdspecs.html>, and
for further background, see DVD Forum (visited Oct. 1,1999)
<http://www.dvdforum.org/foruma.htm>.
14. The Department of Justice has blessed both of the DVD patent pools through its
business review process. See Department of Justice, JusticeDepartmentApproves Joint
Licensing ofPatents(visited Oct. 1,1999)

<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press..releases/1999/2484.htm> and
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press..releases/1998/2120.htm>.
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shell-an overlay that insulated the end-user from the cold,
single-line character-based world of the DOS C:\ prompt.
Microsoft announced its new product on November 10, 1983.
The original New York Times story of November 11, 1983, is
quite illuminating and is worth quoting in full:
The Microsoft Corporation, a leading personal computer
software company, introduced a new program to allow
computer screens to be divided into several windows, each
displaying different tasks that can be performed with the aid
of a handheld device called a mouse.
The new program will compete with Visicorp's new Vision program. Apple Computer Inc.'s Lisa computer also
allows different programs to run in different windows.
Microsoft Windows, as the product is called, will become
an optional part of Microsoft's MS-DOS operating system,
which is used on several personal computers. 15
Lest we forget, Visicorp created Visicalc, the first software
killer app. Visicorp's annual revenues exceeded those of
Microsoft, which in 1982 were about $35 million. 16 Digital
Research, the producer of CP/M, the DOS of its day, already
had introduced its DOS shell, or "operating environment," as
these were sometimes called. In addition, IBM had Topview, a
character-based, multi-tasking environment. Quarterdeck was
selling DesQ, and Apple was soon selling the Macintosh. Plus,
leading applications sellers-Visicorp and Lotus-were
offering their visions of the next step through comprehensive
integrated products. We know that Windows won, but
standards are often set through a substantial competitive
struggle.
So, start with two basic ideas for network industries:
physically-connected grids distributing the three Ps-people,
product, and packets-and virtually-connected business
ecologies organized around a dominant standard. The physical
grids are frequently described as natural monopolies, but to
avoid that phrase, we might say that it simply makes more
sense to have a single integrated facility. The virtual network
could also be described as a natural monopoly, pushed into
15. Microsoft Displays Window Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1983, at D4.
16. See Microsoft Opens its Windows, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19,1983, at 85.
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existence by both supply-side costs and demand-side
spillovers. For this paper, what is interesting is that the
patterns of regulation in these two industry types are
completely different, and it is to that issue that I turn next.

II. PATTERNS OF REGULATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES
The pattern of regulation in network industries ranges from
none whatsoever to episodic intervention through antitrust
litigation, to comprehensive regulation in the form of statutes
such as the Telecommunications Act of 1996.17 These patterns
may occur in sequence, as they did in telecommunications, in
which an antitrust action initially brought against AT&T
resulted in substantial judicial oversight under the modified
final judgment. 8 Only later did Congress intervene directly
through the 1996 legislation. Whether we are on that path now
with regard to the regulation of Microsoft is obviously an open
question.
Regulation through antitrust litigation can result in the type
of narrow injunctive relief that emerged from the Department
of Justice's original action against Microsoft. 19 To an outside
observer at least, the judgment had few important
consequences for Microsoft, unlike the complete restructuring
of an industry that resulted from the action against AT&T.
This form of regulation is anti-democratic in some basic sense
because it is implemented by agencies, parties, and a randomly
chosen judge, but it is also quite tailored to the needs of the
situation. This tailoring is an important benefit of regulation
through antitrust. When we regulate through antitrust,
though, we are also stuck with its most essential feature,
namely, that it is monopolization that is bad, not monopoly.
Judge Hand captured this idea most memorably in Alcoa,
where he wrote that "[t]he successful competitor, having been
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."20

17. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (Supp. 111997).
18. See United States v. AT&T Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub non).,
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also MICHAEL K. KELLOGG Er AL.,
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 199-248 (1992).

19. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
20. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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If a company is fortunate enough to have a monopoly thrust
upon it and does not take too many steps to maintain it but
somehow magically continues to enjoy that monopoly, it is
outside the purview of antitrust. Nonetheless, we lose
deadweight-loss triangles whenever we have a monopoly,
regardless of the manner in which that monopoly is obtained,
whether as manna from heaven or through cunning worthy of
the greatest robber baron bogeyman of that day.
In contrast, legislation aimed at a network industry can
address the monopoly issue quite directly. Indeed, traditional
regulation of so-called regulated industries has addressed
exactly that problem. This regulation has taken the form of
controls directed at prices of outputs-rate of return regulation
coupled with price setting or price caps -coupled with a public
interest standard for building new inputs. These regulations
were designed to control the market power associated with
natural monopoly while ensuring an appropriate return for
investors.
Modern regulation builds on changes in these industries. If
we still need one electric grid, but it makes sense to have many
electricity producers sharing that grid, we need a new
approach to regulation. We move from price regulation
directed at the output market, electricity, to interconnection
and unbundling rules aimed at inputs, transmission service,
with regulated prices at that input level. A new electricity
merchant producer generates electricity but buys transmission
service from the grid owner. In physical network industries,
the grid remains the one-of-a-kind facility, and access to it is
the key regulatory issue. To put the matter most simply, we
have reallocated the interconnection property right away from
the facility owner to third parties. An entrant can jump into the
electricity market just by building a new power plant-and
many firms are doing this21 -without needing to build an
additional (and redundant) transmission grid.
Access regulations shift the interconnection property from
the grid owner to the entrant. Why should this matter? After
all, a potential entrant could have negotiated for access before,
21. See FERCRTO, supra note 9, at 31,393.
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so if it really made sense for the entrant to be in business,
should not a deal have been made? The grid owner could have
voluntarily given access to the grid to merchant generators, just
as it was forced to give limited access to "green" electricity
generators through the PURPA legislation.22 Voluntary access
was always an option, so the bastardized version of the Coase
Theorem suggests that sensible deals should have been made
even when the interconnection property right was held by the
grid owner.
Should we think that this analysis is correct? Probably not.
Notably, the facts seem to suggest, for example, that the
independent power production business has seen an explosion
after the adoption of FERC Order 888.23 It is difficult to see
how an independent developer could negotiate for access to
the grid or build a plant to sell to the grid owner when the
arrangements involve single-use assets with only one
purchaser. The developer would probably sell plants built
speculatively to the grid owner for next to nothing. Deals
negotiated up front would more closely resemble outsourcing
arrangements with a monopoly purchaser, and these deals
would only make sense if the outsider had a comparative
advantage in building plants. In any event, the monopolist has
no reason to want to create a competitor. Under the new
approaches, access to the monopoly input makes it possible for
the entrant to marry its new generating facility with the old
grid and to compete directly with the grid owner.
Creating an access regime is far from easy. The first iteration
of the key rules in the electricity industry, FERC Order 888, ran
for nearly 200 pages of dense, triple-column text in the Federal
Register.24 Three years later, FERC has now changed these rules
substantially.25 We have seen a partial iteration on the
telecommunications rules with the Supreme Court's recent
decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.2 6 In light of this
22. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat.

3117 (1978); see also Peter S. Fox-Penner, CogenerationAfter PURPA: Energy Conservation

and Industry Structure,33 J. LAW & ECON. 517 (1990).
23. See FERCRTO,supra note 9, at 31,393.
24. See Order888, supra note 6:
25. See FERC RTO, supra note 9.

26. 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
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decision, the FCC must rewrite-and has rewritten-its
unbundling regulations so as not to conflict with the "necessary
and impair" standards set forth in Rule 319,27 which may set up
a new challenge to the FCC's Total Element Long Run
Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") pricing scheme. Also, we must
address whether single or joint ownership of the key facility is
preferable. We might tolerate a single owner if we couple that
with mandatory access-this is the path we have gone down in
telecommunications-or we might insist instead on joint
ownership, as we are doing in electricity through independent
system operators today.28
Joint ownership of bottleneck
facilities was precisely the solution offered by the Supreme
Court in the great antitrust case of United States v. Terminal
RailroadAssociation of St. Louis29 when Jay Gould had acquired
the Eads and Merchant Bridges and the Wiggins Ferry to seize
control over railroad crossing of the Mississippi River at St.
Louis.
III. THE INTEL CASE AND THE REGULATION OF NETWORK
INDUSTRIES

The antitrust case against Intel provides a natural context in
which to discuss the appropriate scope of regulation in
network industries. This case is fundamentally about access
and distribution in the context of a dominant standard. The
FTC and Intel have settled the original action, but other
investigations are ongoing. The key point here is to contrast a
purely antitrust focus with one that considered Intel as part of a
regulated industry.
A. FTCAction Against Intel
On June 8, 1998, the Federal Trade Commission issued a
complaint against Intel.3 0 The FTC complaint alleged that Intel
had monopoly power over general-purpose microprocessors. 3 '
27. Id. at 733-36. For the proposed revision, see Third Report and Order and Fourth
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 99-238 (November 5,1999).
28. See Order888, supra note 6.
29. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
30. See Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Intel Corp. (visited Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9288/index.htm> [hereinafter Complaint].
31. See id. at 6.
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Intel was alleged to have entrenched its monopoly power by
refusing to continue to deal with certain customers as a means
of coercing intellectual property licenses relating to potentially
competitive microprocessor technology. 32 Three particular
instances of such abuses were alleged relating to dealings with
Digital Equipment Corporation, Intergraph Corporation, and
Compaq.
On May 12, 1997, Digital had sued Intel for patent
infringement, claiming that the Pentium Pro microprocessor
infringed Digital patents relating to its Alpha microprocessor.
The FTC complaint alleged that Intel responded to the Digital
lawsuit by cutting Digital off from access to relevant
information relating to Pentium microprocessors. 33 In similar
fashion, according to the FTC complaint, Intel demanded a
royalty-free license for Intergraph's Clipper microprocessor
technology as a condition of its willingness to continue
disseminating technical information and advance chips to
Intergraph.34 At this time, Intergraph was a leading seller of
Intel-based Windows NT workstations. Intel's refusal to
distribute information to Intergraph was followed by a
substantial decline in Intergraph's business.35 Finally, in
November, 1994, Compaq sued computer manufacturer
Packard Bell, alleging that Packard Bell's systems infringed
Compaq's patented technology. The parts in question had
been supplied by Intel to Packard Bell, and therefore Intel
intervened in the lawsuit. Again, according to the FTC
complaint, Intel stopped sending Compaq technical
information in an effort to pressure Compaq to resolve its
lawsuit against Packard Bell.3 6
In the FTC's view, these refusals to deal entrenched Intel's
monopoly in general-purpose microprocessors. Intel "willfully
maintained its monopoly power in the general-purpose
32 See id. at pt. C.
33. Seeid. at 19.
34. See id. at

26 & 29.

35. Intergraph filed a private antitrust suit against Intel alleging that Intel had
violated the Sherman Act by cutting it off from access to key information and
microprocessors. It received a preliminary injunction in its favor, see Intergraph Corp.
v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp.2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), which was vacated on appeal. See
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
36. See Complaint, supra note 30, at

35.
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microprocessor market."37 The complaint further alleged that
Intel had the requisite intent to attempt to monopolize the
current generation and future generation general-purpose
As a consequence, in the
microprocessor markets.
constituted unlawful
activities
Intel's
Commission's view,
monopolization, unlawful attempted monopolization, and
unfair competition, all in violation of section 5 of the Federal
38
Trade Commission Act.
On March 8, 1999, a proposed settlement was issued; on
August 3, 1999, by a 3-1 vote, the Commission approved that
settlement without any changes.3 9 In the settlement, Intel
agrees not to withhold key information or access to
microprocessors in intellectual property disputes for a period
of ten years. This agreement is limited only in that if the
customer has not consented in writing that it will not seek an
injunction barring Intel from selling its key microprocessors,
then Intel is entitled to withhold information about the
microprocessors. Most importantly, Intel generally maintains
the right to refuse to deal with customers or to withhold
information for virtually any other business reason. Put
differently, the proposed order does not impose a compulsory
licensing scheme on Intel. In the FTC's view, this order
facilitates competition in microprocessor technologies.
Companies that might have been chilled from developing
competing technologies or from defending their existing
intellectual property rights can do so, secure perhaps in the
knowledge that Intel will not be able to cut them off for that
reason.
The FTC's published analysis of the consent order 40
identified three allegedly harmful consequences of Intel's
behavior. First, it said that Intel received preferential access to
37. Id. at 40.
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
39. See Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter ofIntel Corp. (visited Oct. 29,1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/index.htm>. The press release announcing the final
approval of the settlement is available at Federal Trade Commission, Announced Actions
for Aug. 6,1999 (visited Oct. 29,1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9908/fyi9921.htm>.
40. See Federal Trade Commission, Analysis of ProposedConsent Order to Aid Public
Comment (visited Oct. 1,1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelanalysis.htm>.
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industry technologies through royalty-free licenses. This access
put Intel in a superior position in the microprocessor market.41
Second, the FTC argued that the royalty-free licenses that Intel
received reduced the returns on the competing patents, which
in turn should reduce innovation.42 The third consequence is
more complex:
Finally, Intel's conduct tends to make it more difficult for an
OEM [original equipment manufacturer] to serve as a
platform for microprocessors that compete with Intel's.
Intel's actions ensure that Intel can act as a conduit for
technology flows from one OEM to another .... The result
is that OEMs find it more difficult to differentiate their
computer systems
from their competitors through patented
technology.43
It is worth noting that the FTC's analysis assumes that more
innovation is always better, or, perhaps more precisely, that
innovation should never be discouraged through exclusionary
acts by monopolists. This ignores the fact that it is next to
impossible to assess whether we as a society are doing the right
level of research. Two fundamentally conflicting ideas-too
much research in a tragedy of the commons scenario and too
little research due to the inability of the inventor to grab a big
enough chunk of the benefits of a new idea-suggest the
difficulty with making this assessment. The tragedy of the
commons notion suggests that too many researchers are
pursuing the same ideas. Prior to discovery, no one has a
property right; therefore, getting there first produces huge
gains for the winner. Many entrants rush into the field in an
attempt to obtain these gains, ignoring the fact that in so doing
they are just re-cutting the pie, and at best expanding it only
slightly. Some researcher would find the new idea-a great
deal of nearly simultaneous discovery occurs when an idea is
ready to emerge-and adding another researcher may push up
the date of discovery slightly, but not substantially if many are
already pursuing it. From this perspective, we would need
devices that actually weaken the incentive to do research (or at
least we need t& coordinate research).
Intel would be
41. See id.
42. See id.

43. Id.
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performing a social good by reducing the incentive to do
research. 44
The alternative vision is driven by the empirical fact that
innovators seem to capture a relatively small share of the
benefits of new ideas.45 For this purpose, what matters is that
the figure is not 100 percent. If I have to invest $1 in something
that makes society better off by $2, I need to get at least $1 back
for me to move forward. If I would only get 75 cents, and the
rest of society would get $1.25, I am not going to undertake the
investment. Any figure less than 100 percent means that the
private sector will pass on some projects that make sense for a
society as a whole. This tells us that we have too little research,
and that we need to take steps to bolster research (subsidies to
universities perhaps). Intel's behavior would just make a bad
situation worse.
To complete the list, it is also possible that we are getting it
just right. The fact that value seeps away from the innovator
into society at large means that the patent race is much less
winner-take-all, and that may discourage individuals from
jumping into the race. If our intellectual property system leaks
at just the right rate - optimal seepage or leakage -we may just

counteract the tragedy of the commons problems. The key
point is that how we are doing is unknown and perhaps
unknowable. The FTC's case accepts, largely blindly, the idea
that more innovation is always better. To be fair, the FTC
would probably say that even if we were confident that we
needed to adjust innovation incentives, we would probably not
want to delegate that decision to Intel. Fair enough. So I will
assume, as does the FTC, that more innovation is a good thing.
B. An Antitrust Analysis ofIntel
The settlement of the FTC's suit against Intel prevented us
from learning more about the case from witnesses and an
ultimate decision. We can do no more than speculate about
44. Intel claimed that no evidence was produced to show that its behavior had any
consequence for innovation. See Federal Trade Commission, Intel Corporation's Trial
Brief Public Version (visited Oct. 29,1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/intelbrief.pdf>, at 14-19 [hereinafter Intel Brie].
45. See Michael L. Katz & Janusz A. Ordover, R&D Cooperation and Competition,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 137-39 (1990).
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how the complex issues posed by the case would have been
resolved. My purpose now is not to try to resolve these issues,
but instead to just lay clear the analytical path that an antitrust
analysis would require. 46 For that purpose, the heavily
redacted, public pretrial briefs filed by the FTC and Intel will
suffice. 47
The FTC stated its case quickly. Intel was a monopolist in
the market for general purpose microprocessors. It used its
position to maintain market dominance, and did so by creating
a "privately-administered compulsory licensing regime"
through which it extracted beneficial licenses of competing
technology. This bolstered Intel's monopoly position directly,
by providing access to its own technology as well as that of its
competitors, and indirectly, by discouraging competitors from
developing technology, since the benefits would just flow to
Intel.
The FTC brought its claim under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 48 which declares unlawful "unfair
methods of competition." That expansive language is quite
open-ended, but permits the FTC to pursue illegality under the
standards of the Sherman Act.49 On this basis, the FTC made
claims of monopolization and attempted monopolization under
section 2 of the Sherman Act.5 0 In United States v. Grinnell
Corp.,51the Supreme Court announced the test that still applies
today: "The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance
of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident."52 Under the test of Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
46. For an early, careful, antitrust analysis of the case, see Ronald W. Davis, The
FTC's Intel Case: What are the Limitations on "Throwing Your Weight Around" Using
Intellectual PropertyRights?, 13 ANTITRUST L.J. 47 (1999).
47. See Intel Brief,supranote 44; Federal Trade Commission, ComplaintCounsels'
PretrialBrief Public Version (visited Oct. 29,1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/990225ccpb.pdf> [hereinafter FTC Brie].

48. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
49. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,454 (1986).

50. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
51. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
52. Id. at 570-71. See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S.
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McQuillan,53 attempted monopolization under section 2 turns
on a showing that "(1) the defendant has engaged in predatory
or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power."5 4
From there we move to a definition of monopoly power
(under Grinnell, "the power to control prices or exclude
competition"), 55 a definition of the relevant geographic market
(the world), and a definition of the relevant product market
("general purpose microprocessors used as central processing
units ('CPUs') in reprogrammable digital computers").5 6 The
FTC's brief spends some time segmenting that market: it
differentiated x86 instruction set computers (Wintel) from nonx86 (Macintosh), high-end workstations (often based on RISC
chips (reduced instruction set chips)) from powerful Intel CISC
chips (complex instruction set chips), and low-end machines
where Intel's Celeron chip competes with chips from Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. and Cyrix Corporation. The FTC's brief
sets out InteYs share of revenues from CPUs for 1993 through
the first half of 1998, but these figures were redacted from the
public version of the brief. The FTC contended that these
figures were buttressed by the fact that chip production was
subject to substantial barriers to entry. These barriers arose
from the expense of fabrication plants-the brief cited a $2
billion 1997 figure-and the lead-time required to build these
plants, economies of scale driven by learning-by-doing,
network externality effects, intellectual property rights, and
reputation. The brief then detailed the individual cases
57
involving Intergraph, Digital, and Compaq described above.
The FTC's complaint then turned to characterizing Intel's
conduct as "exclusionary," 58 citing the Aspen Skiing 59 standard
that conduct is unlawful when it "exclude[s] rivals on some
585,596 n.19 (1985).

53. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
54. Id. at456.

55. 384 U.S. at 571 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377,391 (1956)).
56. See FTC Brief supranote 47, at 8.

57. See id. at 25-40.
58. Id. at 40.

59. 472 U.S. 585, 605.
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basis other than efficiency." 60 In the FTC's view, Intel had no
legitimate reason for declining to provide advance technical
information and chip samples. Instead, Intel was using its
monopoly position to gain superior access to competing
technologies and to deter innovation by its competitors, all
with the hope of preserving its CPU monopoly.
Intel responded, opening with a drumbeat based on the
deposition of the FTC's chief economics expert, Professor F.M.
Scherer: "Dr. Scherer acknowledges that there is no evidence
that [competitor's] innovation efforts have been impaired as a
result of the conduct alleged in the Complaint."61 If harm to
innovation was at the heart of the FTC's case, Intel would try to
cut that heart out by showing that the FTC had not been able to
adduce any direct evidence of harm to innovation. Intel went
through competitor after competitor-IBM, Compaq/Digital,
Motorola, Hewlett-Packard, Sun, AMD, and Cyrix among
others-each time ending with the statement "Dr. Scherer
acknowledges ...."62 Intel stood ready to dispute the FTC's
conclusion that Intel had monopoly power in the general CPU
market and emphasized repeatedly that the FTC had offered no
evidence of harm to consumers.
On the key issue of duty to deal/refusal to deal, Intel argued
that only extraordinarily narrow circumstances justify
compulsory access of the sort characterized by the essential
facilities doctrine.63 Intel characterized successful claims under
the essential facilities doctrine as only arising in the context of
horizontal relationships. Aspen Skiing was described as exactly
such a case, one in which joint marketing was seen as
necessary. Finally, Intel argued that it had an abundance of
legitimate business reasons for not giving advance information
and chips to the three companies. Intel held patent, copyright,
and trade-secret rights in this property that it had a strong right

60. See FTC Brief,supranote 47, at 40.
61. Intel Brief,supranote 44, at 15-19.
62 Id.
63. It is worth noting that the FTC had avoided the language of essential facilities, if
not the idea itself, perhaps because of the skepticism with which the doctrine is met.
See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58

ANTITRUST LJ.841 (1990); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, EssentialFacilities,
51 SrAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999).
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to control. Moreover, in this situation, the private litigation
against Intel made it more important for Intel to restrict access
to its intellectual property. Additional access might give
information that would otherwise be non-discoverable, and
this information might make it easier for the litigant to
prosecute its action against Intel. In addition, the point of
giving advance information and chips to customers is not only
to make it possible for the customer to produce new machines,
but also to give important feedback to Intel about its new chips.
There was every reason to think that that feedback would
suffer given the litigation between the companies.
Putting to one side the key factual questions that require
access to the information that would have come forth at trial for
proper assessment, from an antitrust perspective, this case
turns on both the breadth of the mandatory dealing obligation,
which was addressed most recently by the Supreme Court in
Aspen Skiing, and the additional layer of the federally-created
rights of the holder of intellectual property. It is important to
recognize that this case is really quite different from Aspen
Skiing. Aspen Skiing was a we-don't-want-you case. The
affiliated mountains thought that there were sufficient
synergies among those mountains that they did not need to
strike a deal with the excluded mountain/competitor and went
so far as to omit the name of the excluded mountain from the
billboard map of the mountains at the Denver airport. In
contrast, the FTC's claim here is that Intel needed access to the
patents of Intergraph, Digital, and Compaq to maintain its
dominant position in the microprocessor market. Intel wanted
to strike a deal with these companies; the only questions were
whether they would do so, at what price, and whether Intel
could somehow use its position to enhance the terms of trade.
Intel is a case where both sides want access to valuable
intellectual property.
The idea that this case was about preservation of Intel's
monopoly is not very clear in this instance. Intergraph exited
the CPU business when it switched over to Intel chips.
Nothing suggests that Intergraph is in a position to produce
competing chips today. Intergraph will get a bunch of money
if the Pentium line is found to infringe Intergraph's Clipper
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patents, but it is hard to imagine that the operations of the
Pentium will be changed in any fundamental way, as we
should expect Intergraph and Intel to strike a deal. Digital's
Alpha chip was already competing with Intel's chips-rather
unsuccessfully -when the dispute between Digital and Intel
arose. The resulting lawsuits back and forth were resolved
through a settlement, which, after FTC-imposed modifications,
ensured that Alpha production and development would
continue. 64 In both cases, if one believed the underlying
lawsuits against Intel, Intel was using ideas patented by
another company. It needed either to stop using the ideaspossibly disrupting the Pentium edifice-or to get a license to
use the patents.
Indeed, given that there is little reason to think that
competition in CPUs would increase in the short run, the most
likely immediate effect of forcing Intel to pay royalties to
Intergraph or Digital would be to raise the price of Pentium
processors to customers. Intel would face a monopoly supplier
of an input for its Pentium, or PC makers would need to
acquire licenses directly from both Intel and Intergraph. If one
believes the FTC's complaint, Intel has a monopoly in generalpurpose CPUs. Layering one monopoly on a second-or
placing one monopoly next to another when both inputs are
required-gives rise to double-marginalization (monopoly
profits taken out at two levels), which raises prices to Intel's
customers and makes those customers and society worse off.
The key idea here is that Intel and Intergraph would impose
externalities on each other through their royalty decisions. 65
With integration-and the royalty-free cross-license is
equivalent to integration for these purposes-these
externalities vanish. Prices of chips to PC makers should be
lower with the royalty-free cross-licensing than they would be
otherwise.
To see this more formally, suppose that demand for PCs is

64. See Federal Trade Commission, FTCEnsures thatDigital'sAlpha Chip-A Key Rival
to Intel's Chips-RemainsCompetitive (visited Oct. 4,1999)

<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9804/digitala.htm> [hereinafter FTC Alpha Press
Release].
65. Intel makes this point as well. See Intel Brief,supranote 44, at 42 n.19.
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given by p = a - bq. Assume that PC makers face a marginal

cost of c, and royalty rates set by, say, Intel and Intergraph, of ri
and r2. Assume further that the PC business is competitive.
Then, we can work our way back quickly to determine the
royalty rates that will be set, the price of PCs, the quantity of
PCs, and overall social welfare. Competition in the PC
business imposes a zero-profits condition:
(1)
O= pq-c(q)=(a-bq-rl-r 2 -c)q
This gives industry output and the market-clearing price as a
function of the royalty rates:
a-c-(r+r2 )

q

*

(2)
b
"'p =c+r-Ir 2
q =
Intel and Intergraph would set royalty rates to maximize
their individual profits, respectively, riq* and r2q*. The Nash
equilibrium of their simultaneous decisions-Intel is content
with its royalty given Intergraph's and vice versa-gives
royalty rates of:
(3)
= -3aand r2*a-c
r• =*a-c 3--- "1(3)
Plugging these back into the quantity and price formulas
gives us:
*

*a-c

2

/ p*=c+-(a-c)

q =-

(4)

q = 3b 'p
Now suppose that Intel has a royalty-free license from
Intergraph, so that Intel can deliver both patents to PC makers.
Competition in PCs again would be as before, except that the
single royalty rate of r would replace ri + r2. Intel would
maximize rq*, and this would give a royalty-rate of:
* a-c
2(5)
=
2 r
The total royalty rate has dropped by 1/6 (from 2/3 to 1/2
(a-c)), so final market output goes up, and prices drop:
,

q

a-c

=--,

p,

l1

p =c+ (a-c)

2b

2

(6)

Royalty-free cross-licensing means that we do a better job of
getting private costs in line with social costs. The FTC's brief
characterizes Intel's behavior as creating a "privately-
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administered compulsory licensing regime." 66
This
characterization ignores the fact that royalty-free crosslicensing is a common industry practice. Both parties to the
deal benefit from free access to the patent portfolio of both
parties.
These benefits are in-kind from research and
development that should in turn translate into dollars when
each company sells to its customers. Also, as the above
analysis shows, royalty-free cross-licensing would result in
lower prices in the chip market and increased benefits to the
public. 67
This analysis lets us look at the special issues posed by an
intellectual property overlay on Aspen Skiing. Notwithstanding
how we casually talk about patents or copyrights, the
immediate goal of the patent law or copyright law is not to
confer a monopoly on the rights holder. The point of
intellectual property law is to create a scheme of meaningful
property rights for a particular slice of intellectual property.
The intellectual property rights holder should have the same
right to intangible property .that I have for my tangible
property. I exclude you from my watch by possessing it, but I
cannot exclude you from my intellectual property in the same
way. Hence, intellectual property law creates the power to
exclude others, a power implemented through an infringement
action. We could say that we have given you a monopoly over
your intellectual property, but that would not be any more
meaningful than saying that I have a monopoly over my watch.
This realization suggests that the generally applicable anticompetition policy should apply equally to rights tangible and
intangible. We want individuals to write songs and build
watches. If we would impose a mandatory dealing obligation
under antitrust law relating to tangible property, we should not
pause when we switch our gaze to intellectual property.
The royalty-free cross-licensing analysis suggests that there
would be a substantial downside to that access here. I have not

66. FTC Brief,supranote 47, at 1.

67. The FTC and the Department of Justice do recognize that cross-licenses can have
procompetitive effects. See Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelinesfor the Licensing of
Intellectual Property(visited Oct. 4,1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm>.
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tried to model the bargaining issues that arise between
intellectual property rights holders, but we can be sure that the
analysis is quite complex. There is every reason to think that it
would be more difficult for Intel to get access to the patents of
others if it lacked the power to withhold its own intellectual
property. Indeed, that premise forms the basis of the FTC's
action. We could therefore lose the substantial benefits that we
68
get under royalty-free cross-licensing.
C. Intel's ContractingIncentives

Turn from the pure antitrust look to a focus on Intel as the
center of a regulated industry-to-be. To get a handle on the
critical question of mandatory access, start by trying to
understand Intel's private access incentives. Intel faced a
number of basic choices. Intel could have vertically integrated
into computers and sold microprocessors to no one, vertically
integrated into PCs but also sold chips, or stayed out of the PC
market altogether and just sold chips. If Intel sells chips to
outsiders, it must decide whether to sell to all comers or only to
a selected few. These decisions determine the precise sense in
which the Intel situation might have tracked a more
conventional regulated network industry. If Intel sells to all,
then we have a universal access regime, one reached
voluntarily rather than through regulation. If Intel also
integrates vertically, then we have the electricity model, where
grid owners generate electricity but are required to sell access
to competing generators.
The extent to which Intel has vertically integrated has
changed over time, as Intel has gone from producing
microprocessors to adding motherboards, but Intel has never
gone into the PC market. Instead, it sells components to the PC
manufacturer. Intel might have pursued this strategy for any
number of reasons. The conventional wisdom is that the open
architecture scheme of the Wintel platform has decentralized

68. Other wrinkles in the analysis present additional lines of inquiry. For example,
we must consider what happens to innovation when ex-post cross-licensing is
anticipated ex ante. For an analysis, see Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative
Research and Development, 17 RAND J. ECON. 527 (1986) (arguing that royalty-free crosslicensing will reduce innovation under some circumstances).

HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 181 1999-2000

HarvardJournalofLaw & Public Policy

[Vol. 23

decisions about PCs while ensuring that a basic uniform
standard is met. Apple, in contrast, has been much more
vertically integrated, having a stake in the PowerPC chip while
serving-for most of its life-as the sole source of Macintosh
computers.
Intel receives the benefits of having many
companies producing innovation and value to supplement its
chip.
To how many PC makers should/will Intel sell? If Intel
stands ready to sell to everyone on non-discriminatory terms,
we are close to a voluntary version of the mandatory access
regime, save for the important point that Intel will set prices
that reflect its monopoly power while the government will set
prices through administrative proceedings. If the government
price would be lower than the monopoly price-which
obviously would be the goal if not the result-effective access
would be improved.
To begin at the most basic level, think of Intel as having three
instruments with which to work: a fixed licensing fee, a perchip royalty rate, and the number of permitted PC
manufacturers (licensees). Intel would set each of these to
maximize its profits. The general learning of the patent
licensing literature is that the patent owner should auction a
fixed number of licenses, or if an auction is unrealistic, set a
fixed fee for a fixed number of licenses. If that too does not
work, the patent owner should license to anyone 'at a fixed
royalty rate. 69 This conventional wisdom, though, is fuzzy, and
with good reason, as this literature spends little time on the risk
allocation issues that create uncertainty and that might push in
one direction or another. The other point to note is that the
patent case is not perfectly analogous here. Intel spends
billions per year on research and development 70 and then
spends billions more to build the fabrication plants for the
chips. 71 So even after research and development, Intel incurs a
substantial marginal cost to produce each chip it sells. An
auction at a fixed amount or a flat-fee purchase for access
69. See Morton I. Kamien, Patent Licensing, in I HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH

ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 331-54 (eds. Robert J. Aumnann & Sergiu Hart) (1992).
70. See FTC Brief,supranote 47, at 15 (citing the Intel 1997 Annual Report).
71. See id. (quoting Albert Yu, an Intel senior vice president).
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would not send PC makers the right price signals, as the PC
makers would ignore Intel's marginal costs in- producing a
chip. We should think that Intel should engage in two-part
pricing, with a royalty rate set at Intel's marginal cost, and with
the fixed-licensing fee set to extract profits fully from the PC
makers.
If, as probably tracks the facts, Intel looks principally to
royalty rates-per-chip prices-to make its money, then Intel
should be willing to license anyone at the profit-maximizing
royalty rate. A quick look at the relevant equations from the
standard Cournot model will make this dear. Suppose that
demand for PCs is given by p = a - bQ. Assume that
production costs are given by z + cq, where z is the fixed cost of
producing PCs and c is the marginal cost of production. Profits
for a given PC maker are given by (p - c - r)q - z - F, where r is
Intel's royalty rate, and F is Intel's fixed licensing fee.
Maximizing profits in a Cournot equilibrium means that each
producer chooses its q for given rest-of-the-industry output.
With a little work,72 we can establish that industry output Q is
given by:
QN(a-c-r)
(7)
b(N +1)
This is total industry output under Cournot competition with
N licenses and a royalty rate of r.
With marginal costs of cp, profits for Intel are given by:
rip =(r-cp)Q+NF

(8)

or, in equilibrium,
lip
=(r-CpN(a-c-r)

rp 7') Ib (N+)

+NF

(9)

Intel sets r, F and N.
72. Differentiate, with respect to individual firm quantity, the profit function for
each of the N producers to get:

al =(a-bQ-c-r)+q(-b)
We have N of these equations, where N is the number of Intel licensees. To solve this,
set the N first order conditions to zero and sum across the N firms to get:

N(a-bQ-c-r)=bQ
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If we constrain F to be 0-the idea being that other reasons,
probably uncertainty, push towards revenues through chip
prices-Intel chooses r and N. Differentiating Intel's profits
with respect to r and solving the first-order maximization
condition for r gives:
r* a-c-c
(10)
2

Plug this into the formula for Intel's profits, and we get:
(1
p)2
ri

S=

N(a-c-c

4b(N + 1)

This is rising in N, so under these assumptions, Intel wants
as many PC makers as possible. A zero-profits condition in the
PC market will determine ultimate entry.
This crude starting point gives some sense of how we should
expect Intel to behave. Intel would offer licenses to everyone
but would set a monopoly price. If the government had the
will and the information, it might do better by lowering the
price to that which would maximize overall welfare. This
scheme is no more a universal access regime than the one that
Intel would set up privately, only the price is different, so
effective access is higher. In any event, we know that this
analysis ignores many issues that we should expect to be
relevant. Our PC makers are identical, boring zeros, making
only the Coumot quantity decision. Such analysis assumes that
Intel does not care about the identity of the PC makers, it just
wants as many licensees as possible. We have not yet given
any reason that Intel should prefer one licensee to another or
why it should have any interest in cutting off a licensee.
For better or worse, we know that such an assumption runs
contrary to the facts. Like many manufacturers of complex
products, Intel segments its customers into many categories. 73
Intel customers who qualify as Intel Product Dealers receive
training, rebates, and technical information from Intel. 74 This
category applies to systems integrators building fewer than
20,000 PCs per quarter. Customers can take the additional step
73. See Intel Corp., U.S. & CanadaMembership Programs(visited Oct. 29,1999)
<http://channel.intel.com/business/programs/uscanada.htm>.
74. See Intel Corp., LP.D. ProgramBenefits (visited Oct. 4,1999)

<http://channel.intel.com/business/america/ipd/progsumm.htm>.
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of seeking to become an Intel Authorized Solution Provider. 75
These customers must already be in a program such as the
product dealers program, and they must also satisfy Intel
certification tests and other requirements. More steps mean
more benefits, including early information and controlled use
of the Intel logo. These programs are separate from the highly
secretive deals struck by Intel with original equipment
manufacturers. The FTC has an ongoing investigation into this
program, including the very visible "Intel Inside" advertising
program.76 Of course, Intel could be acting just in its private
interests through this program, but there is every reason to
think that broader interests are at stake as well.
The formula for Intel's profits in equilibrium gives us some
sense of why Intel-and society as well-should care about
Intel's customers. Intel's profits are bigger if c is smaller.
Imagine a setting in which the marginal cost of production of
the PC maker is not known, to either the company or Intel,
before production starts. Operations give information. Intel
will want to swap high-cost producers for low ones and could
push exit through its termination policy. The marginal cost of
production is just a proxy for any value that might be added by
the PC manufacturer. This value would include innovations by
a PC maker that would make the computer more attractive for
consumers. To return to the antitrust argument for a moment,
whatever the merits of the FTC's position on competition in
microprocessors, it is hard to see without a much more
complex story why Intel would want to thwart innovations in
products complementary to its CPUs. This claim formed a key
component regarding Intel's behavior as to Compaq. As
should be clear intuitively, Intel cares about the quality of its
licensees; this shows up in equation (11) through the marginal
cost c but applies more generally as well.
D. StrategicLicensing
We still have not approached anything like the facts as seen
75. See Intel Corp., Requirementfor Becoming Authorized (visited Oct. 4,1999)
<http://channel.intel.com/business/authorization/who/index.htm>.
76. See Lisa Dicarlo, Inside Intel. Chip maker's restrictive marketing program-and
millions in subsidies-shacklePC makers, PC WEEK, Apr. 5,1999, at 1.
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by the FTC. Intel did not allegedly cut off or threaten to cut off
Intergraph, Digital, or Compaq because they were bad at what
they did. So turn instead to two possible strategic and
anticompetitive uses of licensing. First, Intel might license
potential competitors in order to reduce incentives to develop
competing microprocessors. Suppose that Intel refused to
license those who might be best situated to compete with it and
either vertically integrated into computer production, or, more
realistically, licensed its microprocessors only to those firms
who were unlikely to enter the microprocessor market. Firms
left outside the PC market would need to enter the
microprocessor market first in order to enter the PC market.
Entry of this sort might ultimately put at risk Intel's market
position in microprocessors. In this scenario, Intel chooses to
keep its enemies close at hand by licensing those firms that
would be its strongest competitors and giving them a chunk of
the returns in the PC market, thereby reducing their incentive
to develop independently competing microprocessors. 7 Thus,
Intel would license to strong potential competitors and would
refuse to license weak potential competitors, all in an effort to
perpetuate its market position in microprocessors.
How would we tell whether or not that happened here?
Intergraph initially built its workstations using the Clipper
chip, a RISC chip sold by the advanced processor division of
Fairchild Semiconductor. 78 In 1987, Intergraph vertically
integrated by purchasing the division and the chip. Five years
later, in 1992, Intergraph decided to consider switching to Intel
processors. The next year, it made the change and dropped
further development of the Clipper chip. According to
Intergraph's complaint, in July 1996, Intel started discussing
the patents covering the Clipper. Intergraph's lawsuit resulted
in a preliminary injunction against Intel. That litigation is still
pending, with the judge having ruled most recently that Intel
does have a license for the Clipper patents, 7 9 and a jury trial on
77. For development of this idea, see Nancy T. Gallini, Deterrence by Market Sharing:
A StrategicIncentivefor Licensing,74 AMER. ECON. REV. 931 (1984).
78. See Intergraph Corp., Intergraph Corp.'s Amended Complaint (visited Oct. 29, 1999)

<http://www.intergraph.com/intel/complnt.htm>

[hereinafter Intergraph Amended

Complaint].

79. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., CV-97-3023-NE (N.D. Ala. October 12,1999)
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the patent infringement issue is scheduled for June, 2000.80
The FTC's complaint did not address this issue; instead, it
focused on the second strategic use of licenses and information:
threatened withdrawal after the customer has become
dependent on access to Intel technology. The customer invests
heavily in Intel chips, and in the words of the Intergraph
complaint:
As a result of the assurances of Intel, and the transition to
Intel-based workstations, Intergraph is now technologically
and economically "locked in" to the use of Intel's CPUs.
Intergraph has designed its products and systems based on
Intel's CPUs and, because there are no high performance
alternatives, Intergraph cannot economically or feasibly
switch to other CPUs. 81
With the customer completely dependent on Intel
technology, Intel has the upper hand and can expropriate value
from its customer through the threat of withdrawal. Intel
therefore could demand, and did, a royalty-free license to the
Clipper technology.
This story only works so well. Intergraph's lock-in must
have been anticipated by both sides. This is a simple case of
specific investments with the threat of after-the-fact hold-up.
There is nothing particularly interesting there; indeed, the more
interesting side is the set of institutional responses, such as
second-sourcing, which are designed to make the hold-up
more difficult.82 Hold-up could have taken the form of
demanding higher payments for chips down the road, or
separate fixed-fee cash payments, or virtually anything else.
Hold-up after specific investment is completely generic. It is
a risk that would be faced by any Intel licensee-not just those
with possibly competing intellectual property rights. The
threat of expropriation is determined by the size of the
(hereinafter October12th Order], vacatingIntergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., CV 97-N-3023-

NE (N.D. Ala. June 4,1999) [hereinafter June4th Order] (visited Oct. 4,1999)
<http://www.intergraph.com/intel/integra.htm>.
80. See <http://www.intergraph.com/intel/>.
81. IntegraphAmended Complaint,supra note 78, at 13.
82 See Joseph Farrell & Nancy T. Gallini, Second-Sourcing as a Commitment, Monopoly
Incentives to Attract Competition, 103 Q. J. ECON. 673 (1988); Michael H. Riordan & David
E.M. Sappington, Second Sourcing,20 RAND J. ECON. 41 (1989). Indeed, second-sourcing
had been a key element of Intel's early success. See TIM JACKSON, INSIDE INTEL: ANDY
GROVE AND THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MosT POWERFUL CHIP COMPANY, ch. 10 (1997).
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investment and the cost of switching to competing technology.
If Intel asks for value and gets it, the form in which tribute is
paid may depend on whether the target has valuable
intellectual property rights, but as a first cut, the amount itself
should be independent of those rights.
We therefore need to say something more refined for the
FTC's story to work. Compare, for example, a royalty-free
license sought before dependence on Intel's technology with
one sought afterwards. When it first dealt with Intergraph,
Intel could have sought a royalty-free license for any patented
Clipper technology arguably infringed by the Pentium line.83
Licensing of this sort is the order of the day in the high-tech
business. Recall that the FTC action focused on patents of
Intergraph, Digital, and Compaq. Digital's original suit against
Intel-and the resulting countersuit by Intel-resulted in a

complex settlement, one piece of which was cross-licensing of
the relevant patents. 84 Intel intervened in Compaq's suit
against Packard Bell, but that suit was ultimately settled with
undisclosed payment terms and a license running in favor of
Packard Bell.85 Indeed, Compaq eventually stood ready to
license its patent portfolio to other PC manufacturers,
including Gateway, and entered into a cross-licensing program
with Intel itself.86
So suppose that Intergraph and Intel had discussed licenses
before Intergraph tied itself to the Pentium line. Assume that
the Pentium chips actually infringed the Clipper technology.
What matters for the negotiation is what the parties know
about this. Think through four rough combinations on the
infringement information: both know the chips infringe;
neither knows; Intel does and Intergraph does not; and vice
versa. If both know, nothing interesting happens; the price
83. Indeed, Intel believed that it had such a license, a position ultimately adopted by
the district court. See October12th Order,supra note 79.
84. See FTC Alpha PressRelease,supra note 64.
85. See Compaq & Packard Bell Settle Patent Litigation, in EDGE: WORK-GROUP
COMPUTING REPORT, June 24, 1996; see also Intel Corp., Compaq and Intel Corporation
Announce New Agreements in Engineering and Marketing (visited Oct. 29, 1999)
<http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/cpqii.htm>.
86. See Lisa DiCarlo, Compaq Licenses Patents to Gateway PC WEEK, Dec. 26, 1994, at
101; Dwight Silverman & Bill Mintz, Compaq, Intel End Feud, Will Share Patents, HOUS.
CHRON., Jan. 19,1996, at 1.
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associated with the infringement action is just that, and it will
either be paid by Intel to Intergraph or netted out if they do a
deal. If neither knows whether the Pentium line infringes the
Clipper patent, whatever terms the parties strike represent a
bet over their ignorance.
If Intel is worried about potential infringement claims, Intel
might use the offer of a royalty-free license from the customer
as a way of smoking out lurking infringement claims.8 7
Customers without competing technology could grant the
license easily, while possible competitors, such as Intergraph,
would be giving up something of value. Intel would effectively
be charging different prices to different customers as a function
of the value of their technology, which is a form of price
discrimination.
One would expect knowing potential
customers to separate out, with those with the best technology
refusing to become Intel customers and being forced to
compete with Intel. That makes clear the risk to Intel of this
approach. Much like the story described above, Intel might
very well prefer to have its strongest competitors dump their
technology and switch to Intel. The upfront royalty-free license
has just the opposite effect with potential customers who have
valuable patents and knowledge.
In the fourth case-Intel knows and Intergraph does not-if
Intel usually seeks royalty-free licenses from customers,
Intergraph learns nothing from the request. Obviously, an
Intergraph-specific request should convey information to
Intergraph about what Intel knows. Indeed, the facts suggest
that Intel added the royalty-free license to a particular nondisclosure agreement it presented to Intergraph after Intel
faced indemnification claims from Intel customers, who in turn
faced patent infringement claims from Intergraph.88
Thus, the possibility of upfront licensing turns on the state of
the parties' knowledge. Intel should find it difficult to get an
upfront license from a company that knows that it has valuable
patent rights. Intel might choose not to pursue such a license if
87. This is a genuine possibility, as the patent law appears to allow patent holders to
wait to assert their claims for as much as six years. See Wanlass v. General Elec. Co., 148
F.3d 1334,1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
88. See June 4th Order,supra note 79.
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it thought that that would merely push away companies that
would then be forced to compete with it. Intel might turn
instead to after-the-fact licenses of the sort alleged in the FTC
complaint.
There is no general claim that Intel tries to rip off all of its
customers. That fact might be explained through a standard
repeat play/reputation story, or, if worse came to worst,
common sense. The more interesting question to ask is why
Intel grabs only from those customers with competing
technologies and why this might be perceived as legitimate by
Intel's customers as a group. This inquiry takes us back to the
double monopolization problem described before. Absent the
royalty-free license, we will have two licensors for the relevant
technology-in this case, Intel and Intergraph. In this scenario,
both technologies would be required to use the Pentium chip.
As we saw before, separate royalty rate-setting by Intel and
Intergraph would result in higher royalty rates than would be
set by a single owner of both patents. Such rate setting will
make Intel's customers as a group worse off. Intel's threat, if
successful, restores single ownership of the patents at stake.
In this framework, potential customers who know that they
have valuable patents will decline to deal with Intel. They will
fear the after-the-fact grab alleged in this case. Potential
customers who do not know that they have valuable patents
will go ahead and deal with Intel, and then face the after-thefact grab. In this scenario, the customers' patent rights lose
value, and Intel's strategy should discourage innovation at the
margin. If the law forbids after-the-fact grabs from customers
with competing patents, customers with knowledge who
would not otherwise deal with Intel will do so, and customers
without knowledge will deal with Intel and receive a greater
return on their patents.
E. Access and PricingRegimes
Put differently, the standard approach of network industry
regulation-non-discriminatory,
open access-makes it
possible for knowing potential customers to do business with
Intel when they would otherwise decline, and this approach
should increase returns to the ignorant with patents who
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would blithely contract with Intel and risk after-the-fact
plunder. This result all comes on top of whatever benefits, if
any, are achieved by substituting government price-setting for
access for Intel's monopoly price-setting of access.
It also would come at the price of substantial government
oversight of an unbelievably dynamic industry. We can slice
and dice the access and pricing rules to gain a better sense of
the possibilities:
1. None. No regulation at all. This is the world prior to
the FTC's action.
2. Context-Specific Negative Duties. Intel cannot bar for
specified reasons access that it would otherwise grant
absent those reasons. This result comes out of the
settlement itself, as Intel cannot use an intellectual
property dispute as a basis for refusing to deal with a
customer.
3. Mandatory Access with Private Prices. Intel can adopt
whatever price schedule it wants, but it must deal with
everyone at these prices.
4. Mandatory Access with Regulated Prices. This is the
contemporary scheme of mandating access to inputs and
89
regulating the price of those inputs.
Take these in reverse order. The fourth possibility is now
familiar to us. It has the virtue of controlling the exercise of
monopoly power, but it comes at the cost of forcing the
government to make repeated, difficult calculations of
Maintaining this scheme would be
appropriate prices.
especially challenging for the government given the speed of
change in the CPU industry. The third possibility is rarely
used, if ever, but it has the benefit of eliminating the
asymmetric information and bargaining issues described
above. It means accepting monopoly pricing. It also risks
disturbing the voluntary process of negotiated, royalty-free
cross-licenses. We need to know much more about those
dynamics before we can confidently say that we improve
matters by taking away from Intel the right to withhold its

89. I will ignore a fifth possibility, namely, that the FTC could regulate prices and

leave the access decision to Intel.
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intellectual property rights as part of an effort to get intellectual
property rights from others.
The second possibility could be imposed either through
antitrust litigation-as occurred here-or through legislation.
These options preserve some dealing and pricing flexibility for
the target of the regulation, but also solve, at least in theory, the
asymmetric information problem. I say in theory, because as
Commissioner Swindle noted in his comments on the
settlement,90 negative duties are very difficult to enforce. Intel
could deny access for a pretextual business reason, when in
reality it was driven by intellectual property motives. If one
believed that such a negative duty was essentially
unadministrable, one would prefer the first or third scheme.
The second approach, like the third approach, may make it
difficult for Intel to strike socially-beneficial royalty-free crosslicenses. Finally, the first possibility-no regulation at allspeaks for itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
As noted before, the FTC's case against Intel turns on tricky
issues regarding the dynamics of cross-licensing. These issues
are essentially barter transactions, and we have only a weak
understanding of when firms will turn to barter. Interfering
with cross-licensing will make it more difficult for these
transactions to take place, and to understand the importance of
that, we need to have a better handle on the relative
importance for a licensor of cash returns versus the in-kind
returns that are obtained from cross-licenses.
We can say with more confidence that the FTC's case appears
to give very little weight to the benefits that arise from royaltyfree cross-licenses.
These licenses eliminate the double
monopoly problem that can arise when two patent holders
hold essential patents. Royalty-free cross-licensing eliminates
through a contract an externality between the patent holders
that would otherwise push up prices, to the detriment of the
patent holders and their customers. The settlement may very
90. See Federal Trade Conmiission, Statement of CommissionerOrson Swindle in the
Matter of Intel Corporation(visited Oct. 4,1999)

<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9904/swindle.htn>.
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well make it more difficult for Intel to negotiate royalty-free
cross-licenses and may harm society in doing so.
But, from the FTC's perspective, that is the main point of the
settlement. The settlement should have the benefit of making it
possible for prospective PC makers who might not deal with
Intel to do so-though this point does not appear to have
figured in the FTC's calculus. These prospective PC makers
will have less reason to fear that Intel will later pressure them
into a cross-license. This security will increase the pool of PC
makers, though the benefits of this are quite speculative.
Equally speculative is whether the settlement will foster
research and development on microprocessors-the chief focus
of the FTC's complaint-though little public evidence suggests
that outcome.
As to the question of whether regulation promotes efficiency
in network industries, the irony here is that the settlement is
generally seen as quite 'narrow and that Intel settled to avoid
much more draconian outcomes. Although that statement is
certainly true, it should not suggest that small steps necessarily
do little harm. What matters is precisely how close you are to
the cliff when you start taking steps, small or large. On that
score, whether the settlement promotes efficiency turns on
quite subtle assessments, none of which are accessible from the
public record in the case, assuming that they were made at all.
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